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COMMENTS
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF DONATIONS OF
ENCUMBERED PROPERTY
Although gifts offer possible tax benefits to donors when
properly made, they involve subtle pitfalls which may result
in significant adverse tax consequences if careful tax planning is not undertaken. The purpose of this comment is to
outline the basic income, gift and estate tax principles appertaining to the different methods of making donations of encumbered property.
Donations of Unencumbered Property
Simple Gift to an Individual

A donor's simple gift to an individual creates no income
tax consequences at the time of transfer; however, the donor
subsequently may suffer adverse tax consequences if he has
made an anticipatory assignment of income. The assignment
of income doctrine is traditionally discussed in terms of a
"tree" (the income mechanism) and its "fruit" (the right to
receive the income produced).' If the donor transfers a tree
with ripened fruit 2 or the fruit alone,3 he will be taxed on the
income in the year the donee receives it. But if the donor
transfers only the tree, he will not be taxed on the income
4
subsequently received by the donee.
In a simple gift the property transferred is free of any
encumbrances, and the donor pays the resultant gift taxes.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the Code) provides that
the amount of the gift for tax purposes is the value of the
property at the date of donation 5 and that the donor is
1. Justice Holmes first set forth the "fruit and the tree" analogy in Lucas
v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See Lyon & Eustice, Assignment oj Income: Fruit
and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 295 (1962)
(discussing income assignment).
2. Bishop v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1952); Austin v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 767 (1947); Rev. Rul.
102, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 32.
3. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
4. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d
331 (5th Cir. 1954). See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2512. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1, T.D. 6826,
1965-1 CUM. BULL. 367, provides: "The value of the property is the price at
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6
primarily liable for the gift taxes arising out of the. donation.
However, to the extent of the value of the gift, a donee is
personally liable for taxes on other gifts made by his donor if
the taxes are not paid by the donor when due, even though
the gift to the particular donee was not taxed.7 The donee's
liability is not contingent upon a determination of a deficiency against the donor or upon an action to collect the
unpaid taxes from the donor;8 furthermore, the donor's primary liability for the tax continues even 'after the donee becomes additionally liable. 9 The statute of limitations for assessment of a deficiency for gift taxes against the donor is
three years after the return is filed, 10 and a donee's liability
for assessment of gift taxes lapses one year after the statute
of limitations for assessment against the donor expires.1"

Simple Gift to a Trustee
Simple gifts in trust are substantively identical to outright gifts, 12 and as a result, the income and gift tax consequences are largely the same. Although the trustee is not
personally liable for taxes assessed against the donor, he does
commit trust corpus and income, to the extent of the value of
which such property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller ......
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2502(d).
7. Fred J. LaFortune, 29 T.C. 479 (1957), a/f'd, 263 F.2d 186 (10th Cir.
1958); Fletcher Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 798 (1943), a.t) 'd, 141 F.2d 36
(7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 711 (1944). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6324(b). For example, § 2503(b) of the Code allows the donor a $3,000 annual
exclusion for gifts made to each donee. If the donor has made other gifts that
result in his owing gift taxes and he fails to pay the gift taxes, a donee who
received a $2,000 gift is personally liable to the extent of $2,000 for the
donor's gift taxes due even though his gift did not lead to the imposition of
the tax.
8. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 186 (8th Cir.
1945).
9. Estate of Craig R. Sheaffer v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 99 (1961), aff'd,
313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(a). Returns filed before the last day
prescribed by law shall be considered as filed on such last day. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 6501(b)(1).
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6901(c)(1), 6901(h).
12. A gift to a trustee and a gift to an individual differ in that a trustee
receives legal title and the beneficiaries of the trust receive equitable title to
the property, while an individual receives both legal and equitable title to the
donated property. P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO THE- LAW OF TRUSTS 1 (1975).
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the gifts the trust receives, for any gift taxes not paid by the
3
donor when due.1
Donations of Encumbered Property
Donations of encumbered property typically involve
mortgaged land or securities already pledged as collateral for
loans made by the donor. The tax consequences of these donations vary depending upon whether the encumbrance is
greater or less than the donor's adjusted basis in the gift
property and whether the donee assumes the encumbrance or
takes the property subject to the encumbrance.
Income Taxation Upon. Transfer
When the donor transfers property encumbered in excess
of his adjusted basis 14 to an individual who assumes the encumbrance, ultimate primary liability on the debt shifts from
the donor to the donee; 15 when burdened property is donated
to a trustee who assumes the encumbrance, the trust becomes primarily liable on the debt, and the trustee commits
trust income to payment of the debt.' 6 Since donations to
trustees and individuals are substantively identical transfers,
the income tax consequences of both types of donations will
be the same when the encumbrance exceeds the donor's basis.
The courts have accepted the Internal Revenue Service's
argument that an assumption results in a pecuniary benefit
to the donor that constitutes consideration for the gift.' 7 Be13. See Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1016.
15. The mortgagee may treat as his debtor the vendee of mortgaged
property who has assumed payment of the vendor's debt without thereby
creating a novation and discharging the mortgagor. In the absence of a
novation, it is presumed that the mortgagee has retained the liability of the
mortgagor at the same time he accepts the new debtor. LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
2185-94; Latiolais v. Citizen's Bank, 33 La. Ann. 1444 (1881); Jacobs v. Calderwood, 4 La. Ann. 509 (1849). However, if there is a foreclosure and the
mortgagor has to pay any deficiency, he is subrogated to the mortgagee's
rights against the transferee who has assumed the debt. As a result, when
the transferee assumes an encumbrance, he is ultimately primarily liable on
the debt. Wilkinson v. Adams, 179 La. 630, 154 So. 630 (1934); Isaacs v.
VanHoose, 171 La. 676, 131 So. 845 (1930). See Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La.
Ann. 497 (1880). See generally 55 AM. JUR. 2d, Mortgages § 1037 at 882 (1971).
16. Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
17. Id., aff'd per citriam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972); Oates v. United
States, 24 AFTR 2d 69-5628 (N.D. Tex. 1969). See Citizen's Nat'l Bank v.
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cause these transfers cannot be considered wholly gratuitous,
the Service has characterized them successfully as part sales
and part gifts."' The sale portion is the amount by which the
value of the liability assumed exceeds the donor's adjusted
basis in the property, and the donor realizes taxable gain to
that extent. 19
. When a donee assumes an encumbrance less than the
donor's adjusted basis in the gift property and becomes
primarily liable on the debt,20 the assumption results in a
pecuniary benefit to the donor that constitutes consideration
for the gift. However, although the Service classifies transfers in which the donee assumes an encumbrance as part
sales and part gifts, because the debt assumed does not exceed the donor's adjusted basis there is no sale portion, and
21
thus no taxable gain is realized by the donor.
When the donee does not assume, but takes the property
subject to an existing encumbrance, the income tax consequences are not settled. Under the rationale of the United
States Supreme Court in Crane v. Commissioner,22 the donor
United States, 417 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1969). The rationale of the decisions is
that release from ultimate primary liability on the encumbrance by the
donee's assumption of the debt results in a pecuniary benefit to the donor.
18. See discussion in note 17, supra.
19. Whether the gain will be accorded capital gains treatment or will be
taxed as ordinary income depends upon the nature of the property and the
length of time the donor has held the property. See INTERNAL REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 1221-23 for rules on capital gains. In determining the holding period a
trustee may tack onto the settler's holding period. Citizen's Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 417 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1969). Contra, Rev. Rul. 232, 1971-1 CUM.
BULL. 275.
20. See discussion in note 15, supra.
21. Tax Consequences of Gifts of Encumbered Property in Trust, 8 REAL
PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 371, 371-74 (1973). See Malone v. United

States, 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 417 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1969).
22. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). For discussions of Crane vis-a-vis income tax consequences of donations of encumbered property, see Berl, Disposition of Property Mortgaged in Excess of Basis, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAXATION 1033
(1961); Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized under Crane: A Current View of
Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1969);
Edwards, How to Save Money by Making Gifts, N.Y.U. 32D INST. ON FED.
TAXATION 367 (1974); Lowenstein, Federal Tax Implications of Gifts Net of
Gift Taxes, 50 TAXES 525 (1972); Comment, Income Tax Consequences of Gifts
of Property Encumbered in Excess of Basis, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 770 (1960);
Note, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 440 (1975); Note, 17 STAN. L. REV. 98 (1964). Contra,
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arguably realizes taxable gain upon the transfer whether he
created the encumbrance, -assumed an existing encumbrance
or purchased the property subject to it.23 In Crane the taxpayer inherited real property subject to a mortgage securing
a debt equal to its value. She later sold the property for $3,000
cash to a purchaser who took the property subject to the
mortgage. The taxpayer argued that the amount realized
upon the sale did not include the amount of the mortgage.
The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and explained:
[W]e are no more concerned whether the mortgagor is,
strictly speaking, a debtor on the mortgage, than we are
with whether the benefit to him is, strictly speaking, a
receipt of money or property .... If he transfers subject
to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal
24
debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another.
Thus an argument could be made that whether a donee
takes subject to the mortgage or assumes it, the benefit to the
donor is "real and substantial" upon the transfer. However,
the argument ignores the part sale, part gift decisions which
place primary emphasis upon whether a donee took the property subject to a mortgage or personally assumed the debt
the mortgage secures. 25 Moreover, in Malone v. United
States,26 the court expressed doubt that Crane established the
broad position asserted by the Service "that taxable gain is
always realized when a taxpayer disposes of property mortgaged in excess of the taxpayer's adjusted basis. ' ' 27 When the
donee takes the property subject to an encumbrance, the
donor realizes no pecuniary benefit upon the transfer in the
form of a release from primary liability on the encumbrance.
Hence the transaction is wholly gratuitous, and no taxable
Palmer, Tax Saving Through Charitable Giving, 36 TAXES 40 (1958); Spears,
Mortgages in Excess of Basis, 1959 SO. CAL. TAX INST, 883 (1959).
23. In Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), the court in dicta said
it was immaterial for income tax purposes whether stock was transferred
subject to loans or whether the donees assumed the loans, since in either
case the benefit to the transferor was real and substantial. Rev. Rul. 626,
1970-2 CUM. BULL. 158.
24. 331 U.S. at 14 (emphasis added).
25. E.g., Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971);
Oates v. United States, 24 AFTR 2d 69-5628 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
26. 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
27. Id. at 113.
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gain upon the transfer should exist under the rationale of the
part sale, part gift decisions. Also, double taxation would
occur if a donor were taxed at the time of the transfer on the
difference between the value of the encumbrance and the
donor's adjusted basis and then later taxed on trust income
28
used to discharge the debt.
Income Taxation Subsequent to. Date of Donation!
When the donor transfers property encumbered either in
excess of or less than his adjusted basis to a trustee who
assumes the encumbrance and uses trust income to discharge
the debt, the Service contends that the donor has not divested
himself of that portion of the trust income used to pay his
debt. 29 Therefore, it asserts that if the donor remains liable in
"any capacity" on the indebtedness assumed by the trustee,
he will be treated as an owner of that portion of trust income
30
used to pay his debt.
In Douglas v. Willcuts 31 the grantor had established a
trust to pay his divorced wife an annual sum in lieu 'of
alimony. The United States Supreme Court held the trust
income taxable to the grantor, reasoning that the grantor
constructively received the income used to discharge his' legal
obligation to support his wife, for which he remained primar32
ily liable.
In.Hays' Estate v. Commissioner33 the decedent donor had
.28. See discussion in text at note 42, infra.
29. INTERNAL REV. CODE OF 1954, § 677(a) (restraints on the assignment
of income and trusts). Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-l(d), T.D. 7148, 1971-2 CUM.
BULL. 251 (donor is not treated as owner of a portion of the trust under
section 677(a) of the Code when an adverse party must consent to discharge
the assumed debt).
30. Rev. Rul. 516, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 54. For theories supporting this
notion of liability in "any capacity," see Comment, Assumption of Indebtedness by a Donee-Income Tax Consequences, 17 STAN. L. REV. 98 (1964).
Commentators, however, have taken a position contrary; to this notion of
liability in "any capacity." See, e.g., Fishman, Income Tax Aspects of Third
Party Payments of Taxpayer Obligations, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAXATION 31 (1961); Reiff, Donee-Paid Gift Tax: Some Considerations, A.B.A.J.
1325 (1972); 5 CCH 1975 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 3749.1811.
31. 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
32. Accord, Lucy A. Blumenthal, 30 BTA 591 (1934), rev'd, 76 F2d 507 (2d
Cir. 1935), rev'd per curiam, 296 U.S. 552 (1935) (United States Supreme Court
apparently agreeing with trial court that grantor remained primarily liable
on the debt and was therefore taxable on trust income).
33. 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1950). Section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue
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transferred land encumbered by a mortgage to a trustee who
assumed the mortgage. The issue before the court was
whether the trustee's discharge of the mortgage with trust
income was a discharge of a legal obligation of the donor that
would cause the land to be included in the donor's gross
estate for estate tax purposes. The Fifth Circuit found the
controlling factor to be whether primary liability for the debt
had shifted from the donor to the trustee, and since under
applicable state law primary liability for the debt did shift to
the trustee, the donor remained contingently liable for any
deficiency after a foreclosure sale. The court decided, however, that the donor's contingent liability was so remote that
discharge of the debt with trust income did not constitute
reservation by him of an income interest sufficient 34to cause
the land to be included in the donor's gross estate.
35
Another Fifth Circuit decision, Edwards v. Greenwald,
involved donations of partnership interests to trusts on the
condition that the trustee assume payment of the debts incurred by the donors in acquiring the donated partnership
interests. In rejecting the contention of the Service that trust
income used to discharge the debts was taxable to the donors
on the basis of §§ 32 and 167 of the Internal Revenue Code of
37
the court found that the
193936 and the Willcuts decision,
donors incurred the debts contemporaneously with the creation of the trusts and incurred them solely for the benefit of
the trusts. Significantly, the court determined that because
under applicable state law primary liability for the debts
shifted to the trustee, discharge of the debt was not a disCode provides that a decedent's gross estate includes transfers in which the
decedent has retained a life interest, and Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(6)(2), T.D.
6501, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 271 further provides that a decedent retains a life
estate in property transferred in trust or otherwise (except to the extent that
the transfer was for adequate consideration in money or money's worth)
when the income from the property so transferred is used to discharge a legal
obligation of the decedent. This estate tax regulation and the regulations
under § 677 of the Internal Revenue Code are similar since the donor in
either instance is taxed with the portion of trust income which is used to
discharge his legal obligations.
34. 181 F.2d at 171.
35. 217 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1954).
36. These provisions correspond to §§ 61 and 677 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, respectively.
37. The Service also relied on Blumenthal, which is discussed at note 32,
8upra.

1976]

COMMENTS

charge of the donor's obligation but was rather satisfaction of
38
the trustee's legal obligation.
Thus, the cases apparently do not support the Service's
position that continued liability of the donor in "any capacity" should result in taxation to him of trust income used to
discharge the obligation.3 9 Since Edwards emphasized a shift
of primary liability for the debt, the donor's liability for income tax on trust income the trustee uses to pay the debt
should hinge solely upon his continued primary liability on
the debt. Therefore, to secure favorable tax consequences
when making donations of encumbered property to a trust,
with trust income to apply toward the debt, one should insure
that primary liability for the debt shifts to the trustee, the
donor incurs the debt contemporaneously with the creation of
the trust, and the debt is incurred solely for the benefit of the
trust.
If property is donated subject to a preexisting mortgage,
the donor remains primarily liable on the debt and the encumbrance remains his legal obligation. 40 Furthermore,
§ 677 of the Code treats the donor as the owner of trust income used to discharge his legal obligations, and this trust
income is taxable to the donor. Since the tax implications
subsequent to the date of transfer are well-defined in these
types of donations, 41 the danger of double taxation exists if
the donor is also taxed at the time of transfer; 42 he should not
be taxed upon the transfer. On the other hand, if the donor
has taken property subject to an encumbrance on which he
was never personally liable and later donates the property to
a trustee who likewise takes the property subject to the encumbrance, trust income used to discharge the debt is not
taxable to the donor under § 677(a) of the Code since the
payment is not a discharge of his primary legal obligation. 43
38. 217 F.2d at 634-35.
39. See Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 33 AFTR 2d
74-1075 (5th Cir. 1974); Jenn v. United States, 25 AFTR 2d 70-756 (D.C. Ind.
1970).
40. Balfour v. Chew, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 154 (La. 1826); HEP Development
Corp. v. Mouton, 256 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
41. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 677(a).

42. See discussion in text at notes 22-28, supra.
43. Anytime a donor transfers encumbered property to an individual who
takes the property subject to the encumbrance or assumes it, care mLst be
taken to avoid an anticipatory assignment of income and the resultant adverse income tax consequences. See discussion in text at notes 1-4, supra.
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Gift Taxation
When a donee assumes the donor's debt, the formula for
determining the gift tax due from the donor is the same
whether the donor's adjusted basis is greater or less than the
encumbrance assumed. The transfer is classified as part sale
and part gift; 44 the gift portion' of the transfer is the amount

by which the fair market value of the property exceeds the
debt assumed. Therefore, the encumbrance is deducted from
the value of the property and the donor pays gift taxes on the
45
remainder.
If the donor has placed an encumbrance on property or
has taken property by assuming a preexisting'encumbrance,
and he later transfers the property to a donee who takes the
property subject to the encumbrance, the donor remains
primarily liable on the debt. For reasons previously discussed, 46 the donor receives no pecuniary benefit upon the
transfer and as a result the transfer is wholly gratuitous;
therefore, the donor owes gift taxes on the full value of the
property unreduced by. the encumbrance. 47 On the other
hand, if the donor has taken property subject to an encumbrance for which he is not personally liable, a later donation
of the property is in actuality merely a transfer of his equity,
and thus the amount of the gift is the value of the property
48
reduced by the encumbrance.
Net Gifts to Individuals and Trustees
A net gift is a donation in which the donee agrees to pay
the donor's gift taxes resulting from the donation. Possible
reasons for making net-gifts are that the donor may possess
illiquid assets and be unable to obtain readily the cash needed
to pay his gift taxes, or that he may be forced to sell a portion
44.
Malone
States,
45.

Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. United States, 417 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1969);
v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Oates v. United
24 AFTR 2d 69-5628 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
Id.
46. See discussion in text at notes 22-28, supra.

47. In Oates v. United States, 24 AFTR 2d 69-5628 (N.D. Tex 1969), the
Service contended in the alternative that if the donees were found not to
have assumed the encumbrance, then the value of the gift for gift tax purposes should not have been reduced by the encumbrance.
48. D. S. Jackman, 44 B.T.A. 704 (1941), acquiesced, 1942-1 CUM. BULL. 9;
R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
9-40 (1974).

1976]

COMMENTS

of highly appreciated property to pay the gift taxes so that to
have a donee in a lower tax bracket sell the property and pay
the taxes may be more advantageous.
Income Taxation Upon Transfer
Turner v. Commissioner,49 the first net gift decision, involved donations of stock to three individuals and to six
trusts, conditioned upon each donee's payment of:his pro rata
share of the donor's gift taxes resulting from the transfers. In
its deficiency notice, the Service contended that the transfers
to the trusts and to the individuals were part sales, and part
gifts; however, on brief the Service conceded that the transfers to the trusts were in no part sales. The Service attempted
to distinguish the transfers to the trusts and the transfers to
the individuals on the basis that "the trustees were not personally liable for the tax while the individual transferees
personally promised to pay the tax." 50
As to- the transfers to the individuals, the Service attempted to classify the donor's potential gift tax liability as
an encumbrance, i.e. a gift subjecting the donee to payment
of the gift tax was partly a sale and partly a gift. The Tax
Court rejected this classification and held that the donor did
not have taxable gain upon the transfer. 51 Moreover, the
court stated that the transfers to individuals and to trusts
are substantively identical and cannot be characterized differently for income tax purposes on the basis of the type of
52
promise obtained from the donee.
Net gift decisions subsequent to Turner uniformly reject
the Service's attempt to classify the donor's potential gift tax
liability as an encumbrance.5 3 However, 'the predictability of
49. 49 T.C. 356 (1968), afj'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969),
non-acquiesced 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 3..
50. Id. at 362-63.
51. Id. at 364.

52. Id. at 363. The court set forth two reasons for its decision in the
donor's favor. First, the court stated that thel donor intended only to make a
net gift, i.e., a gift of the value of the stock less the amount of the gift tax
payable on the. transfers. Id. Additionally; the court was concerned over the
fact that the donee would receive double credit in computing his basis under
Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4, T.C. 7207, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 106, if the transactions
were characterized as part sales, part gifts, and reasoned that this was a
"persuasive indication that the part sale/part gift characterization is not
appropriate to the facts of the instant case." Id. at 364.
. 53. E.g., Estate of Kenneth W. Davis, 30 T.C.M. 1363 (1971), af.f'd per
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income tax consequences upon the transfer of net gifts has
been disturbed by the recent decision of the Sixth Circuit in
Johnson v. Commissioner.54 Dr. Johnson had obtained a nonrecourse loan in the amount of $200,000, pledging 50,000
shares of stock as collateral. The fair market value of the
stock was in excess of $500,000 and Dr. Johnson's adjusted
basis in the stock was $10,812.50. Within two days of the loan
he transferred the stock to trustees who subsequently substituted their own notes for Dr. Johnson's promissory note. The
loan proceeds received by the donor exceeded his ultimate gift
tax liability. Since the donor secured the loan and actually
paid the gift taxes himself with the loan proceeds the decision
did not involve a net gift per se. However, the results of
transactions like the one in Johnson and net gifts are the
same, since the donee in actuality pays the donor's gift taxes
in both situations.
The Tax Court found the instant case similar to those
decisions in which the donor transfers property encumbered
in excess of basis to a trustee who assumes the encumbrance
and stated that a similar result was required. 55 The court
found that the donor obtained real and substantial benefits
upon the trustee's assumption of the debt, 56 and as a result
held that the transfer was part sale and part gift. To the
extent that the debt the donee assumed exceeded the donor's
adjusted basis, the transfer was a sale and the donor realized
taxable gain. The Tax Court distinguished the case before it
from Turner,57 apparently, intending to preserve the income
tax advantages available through the use of net gifts.
curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 19,72); Victor W. Krause, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 1972 P.-H.
61,000 (6th Cir. 1972).
54. 59 T.C. 791 (1973), a#t'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1040 (1974). For a discussion of the decision, see Covey, Recent Developments Concerning Estate, Gift, and Income Taxation-1973, 8 INST. ESTATE
PLANNING 10-1, 10-48 (1974); Note, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 880 (1975); BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, TMM 75-05 (1975).
55. See discussion in text at notes 14-19, supra, for a discussion of the
income tax consequences of these types of donations.
56. 59 T.C. at 812.
57. The Tax Court distinguished Johnson and Turner as follows: (1) the
transfers in Johnson were not conditioned on the donees' payment of the gift
tax;'(2) in Johnson the donors did not receive any right or interest in trust
income or corpus as was found in Turner; (3) the loans in Johnson were not to
be equated with the gift tax liability in Turner, the court being impressed
with the fact that the loans in Johnson exceeded the gift taxes due; and (4) on
the basis of all the facts presented the transfers in Johnson were in reality
part sales and part gifts, and not net gifts as in Turner. 59 T.C. at 812-13.
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On appeal to the Sixth Circuit the donor argued that the
loan proceeds he used to pay his gift taxes should escape
taxation on the basis of Turner. The Sixth Circuit obviously
was frustrated by fine distinctions in prior cases 58 and cast
doubt upon their validity by holding that the donor realized
gain upon the transfer and that whether the transfer was
described as a part sale, part gift or as a net'gift was of no
importance.5 9
. Edna Bennett Hirst,60 the first net gift decision by the
Tax Court subsequent to Johnson, involved bona fide net gifts
to individuals and to trusts. The Service argued that as a
consequence of Johnson, the donor's potential gift tax liability
was an encumbrance and, therefore, a gift subjecting the
donee to payment of the gift tax was part sale and part gift.
While noting the conceptual correctness of the Service's contention that the portion of the value of the gift equal to the
gift taxes escapes taxation, the court nevertheless rejected it
and held that the donor incurred no taxable gain upon the
transfers. Thus, the Tax Court seems willing to continue allowing donors to escape income taxation upon the gift tax
portion of net gifts "in the absence of any clear cut overruling
.of prior law'[Turner] by a Court of Appeals."'"
Income Taxation Subsequent to Date of Donation
When a donor makes a net gift to a trustee, the Service
contends that trust income used to discharge the donor's gift
tax liability is taxable to the donor under § 677(a) of the Code.
Furthermore, it asserts that when the trustee uses borrowed
funds to pay the donor's gift taxes, the donor is taxable with
58. For illustrations of the varied tax consequences resulting'from fine
distinctions in tax planning, see Note, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 880 (1975).
59. 495 F.2d at 1083. It has been suggested that analyzing the transfer as
other than a part sale, part gift could result in taxation at ordinary income
tax rates since the sale or exchange requirement of § 1222 of the Code does
not appear to be met. Duhl & Cohen, The Net Gift Technique: A Current
Analysis of the Requirements for Its Successful Use, 42 J. TAXATION 158, 163
(1975).
60. 63 T.C. No. 27 (1974). At the time of this writing this appears to be the
only net gift decision by the Tax Court since Johnson.
61. Id. at No. 27. At the time of this writing Hirst is on appeal to the
Fourth Circuit. Some suggest that even if Johnson should become the law as
regards net gifts, the courts might not apply Johnson retroactively if the
donor has undertaken his transfers in reliance upon Turner. Duhl & Cohen,
The Net Gift Technique: A Current Analysis of the Requirements for Its
Successfil Use, 42 J. TAXATION 158, 162 (1975).
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trust income used to discharge the loans in years subsequent
62
to the year in which the gift taxes are paid.
3
In Estate of Annette S. Morgan6 the trustee borrowed
funds to pay the gift taxes, which he had agreed to pay as
condition to the gift. The court held the donor taxable under §
677(a) on all income earned by the trust in the year in which
his gift taxes were paid. However, it also held that trust
income used to repay the loan in years subsequent to that in
which the gift tax liability was discharged was not taxable to
6 4
the donor.
Victor W. Krause 6 5 another case in which the trustee
borrowed funds to discharge the donor's gift taxes the trust
had assumed, subsequently extended the rationale of Morgan.
In Krause the Tax Court rejected the Service's contention
that the donor was taxable on all trust income earned in the
year the gift taxes were paid under § 677(a), and held that a
donor is taxable only with trust income earned up to the date
on which gift taxes were paid.66 The court further held that
the donor is not taxable with trust income earned subsequent
62. Rev. Rul. 564, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 328. The only support found for
this Revenue Ruling is Estate of Annette S. Morgan, 37 T.C. 981, 986 (1962)
(TietJens, J., dissenting).
63. 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd per curiam, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963).
64. The grantor should avoid making personal loans to the trust in order
for the trustee to pay the grantor's gift taxes, because his interest in the
trust will not terminate upon payment of the gift taxes and he will be taxed
with trust income used to discharge the loan in years subsequent to that in
which the gift taxes were paid. See Clifton B. Russell, 5 T.C. 974 (1945), appeal
dism'd, 154 F.2d 829 (lst Cir. 1946). Furthermore, when the donor secures the
trustee's promise to pay a specified sum from trust income to enable the
donor to pay his gift taxes, the donor is taxable with the trust income. Estate
of A. E. Staley, Sr., 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), affd, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1943).
65. 56 T.C. 1242 (1971).
66. When a net gift is made to an individual, care must be taken to avoid
an anticipatory assignment of income. See discussion in text at notes 1-4,
supra. Since the transfer of net gifts involves no income tax consequences
and income taxation subsequent to the date of transfer can be avoided, net
gifts offer significant tax benefits to donors. Also, substantial tax savings are
possible through proper planning of the date of the donation and the timing
and manner of the gift taxes. The donation should be made as near to the end
of the calendar quarter as possible and the gift taxes should be paid as soon
as possible in order for the donor to avoid income taxation of trust income
under § 677(a) of the Code. See Kopp, Gifts Subject to Donee Payment of Tax:
Timing, Risks, and Computation, N.Y.U. 27TH INST. ON FED. TAXATION 375
(1969); Note, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 880 (1975).
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to the date on which the gift taxes were paid since the donor
had no further obligation to which trust income could be
applied within the meaning of § 677(a).6 7 The Service has
further argued that payment by the. donee of the donor's gift
taxes with borrowed funds constitutes a purchase or liquidation of the donor's income interest; however, to date the
courts have rejected this argument consistently. 8
Gift Tax Consequences
The Service finally has conceded that when a net gift is
made, the amount of the gift is the value of the property less
the gift taxes due on the donation, and it has provided an
algebraic formula for determining the gift taxes due,6 9 However, the donation must meet two conditions in order to reduce the value of the gift by the gift taxes due. First, the gift
must be made subject to the condition that the gift taxes will
be paid by the donee or out of the transferred property. 70 If,
for example, such a provision is lacking, and after the donation all. parties in interest join in a direction to the trustee to
pay the gift taxes from. trust corpus, the value of the gift
property cannot be reduced by the gift tax liability.7 1 Second,
the gift tax must actually be paid by the donee or out of the
72
gift property.
67. Estate of Craig R. Shea.ffer, 25 T.C.M. 646 (1966), is,therefore, overruled to the extent the court stated that a taxpayer found to be a substantial
owner of a portion of a trust under §§ 671-77 of the Code was taxable on all
income attributable to such portion for the entire taxable year. However,
Scheaffer's holding that trust income used to pay subsequent gift tax
deficiencies is taxable to the donor still appears to be good law.
68. Estate of Kenneth W. Davis, 30 T.C.M. 1363 (1971); Victor W. Krause,
56 T.C. 1242 (1971). In Davis the court also relected the Service's further
contention that the donor retained an income interest in the trust to the
extent of the gift tax paid and that payment of the tax itself resulted in
ordinary income to the donor under §§ 671 and 677.
69. Rev. Rul. 72, 1975-1 CUM. BULL. 310.
70. There should be a written agreement to insure that this condition is
met. Schriebman, Structuring a Net Gift That Will Stand Up: How to Satisfy
I.R.S. and the Courts, 39 J. TAXATION 6 (1973).
71. Estelle Mary Affelder, 7 T.C. 1190 (1946). Also, if no agreement that

the donee will pay the gift taxes exists when the transfer is made and the
statute of limitations for a deficiency assessment against a solvent donor has
expired, the value of the gift cannot be reduced to the extent of the gift tax
lien in determining the amount of the gift. Evelyn N. Moore, 1 T.C. 14 (1942),
affd 146 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1945).
72. Rev. Rul. 72, 1975-1 CUM. BULL. 310.
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Basis Considerations
The Code provides that the donor's basis in his property is
his cost, which must be adjusted in accordance with other
sections of the Code. 73 The basis includes debt obligations
created by a purchase-money mortgage 74 and, also, preexisting liens on the property even though not personally assumed .
In transactions characterized as part sales and part gifts
the donor has taxable gain to the extent the amount realized
exceeds his adjusted basis. 76 Since this formula for computing
gain does not allocate the donor's basis between the sale
portion and the gift portion but rather applies the donor's full
basis against the amount realized, the donor realizes less
77
gain than would be the case under an allocation formula.
Some criticize this non-allocation formula for part sale, part
gift transactions and suggest that legislation be adopted requiring a donor to allocate his basis in a manner similar to
78
the allocation formula- for bargain sales to charity.
To date no reported case has considered a trust's basis in
property transferred to it subject to the condition that the
trustee pay the donor's gift taxes. Furthermore, since the
courts consistently have rejected the Service's contention
that net gifts to individuals are part sales and part gifts, the
individual donee's basis is determined in accordance with sec79
tions 1015(a) and 1015(d) of the Code.
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012. However, in a taxable exchange, the
fair market value of the property is the basis. Philadelphia Park Amusement
Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
74. Manuel D. Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966). However, after the property
has been purchased, subsequent borrowings do not change the basis regardless of whether the owner is primarily liable on the debt. Woodsam Associates, Inc., 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aif'd, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
75. Blackstone Theatre Co., 12 T.C. 801 (1949).
76. Joseph W. Johnson, Jr., 59 T.C. 791 (1973); Malone v. United States,
326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971). See Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. United States,
417 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1969); Elizabeth H. Potter, 38 T.C. 951 (1962); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), TD. 7213, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 482.
77. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7213, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 482
with Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-2(b) (1972), T.D. 7213, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 491.
78. Warren, The Income Tax Effects of PartiallyDonative Transfers, 110
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 712 (1971); Note, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 517 (1974). See also
Note, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 880 (1975). A bargain sale to charity is a sale
for which a deduction is allowed under § 170 of the Code as provided in § 1011
of the Code.
79. Section 1015(a) provides that "the basis shall be the same as it would
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When a trustee or an individual assumes an encumbrance
on a donation the Service has been successful in characterizing such donations as part sales and part gifts. A trustee's
basis in the donated property is the same as the donor's basis
increased by the amount of gain or decreased by the amount
of loss recognized on the transfer.8 0 An individual's basis in
the donated property is the greater of the sale portion of the
transfer or the donor's adjusted basis in the property at the
date of donation plus the amount of increase, if any, authorized by § 1015(d) of the Code for gift taxes paid. 8 ' Since
the basis formula for an individual donee does not allocate
the donor's adjusted basis between the sale portion and the
gift portion, the donee receives a more favorable tax basis
82
than. if an allocation formula were employed.
Estate Tax Consequences
The Code provides that if a donor has retained an income
interest in property transferred in trust or otherwise, and the
interest has been retained for life "or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death," 83 then upon his
death his gross estate shall include the value of the property
transferred to the extent of his interest therein.8 4 The donor
retains an income interest to the extent that the trustee uses
the right to income, possession, use or enjoyment of the property to discharge the donor's legal obligations. s5
Since the donor remains primarily liable for his gift taxes
be in the hands of the donor or the last preceding owner by whom it was not
acquired by gift, except that if such basis ... is greater than the fair market
value of the property at the time of the gift, then for purposes of determining
loss the basis shall be such fair market value." Section 1015(d)(1)(A) provides
for an increase in basis (but not above the fair' market value of the property
at the time of the gift) for the gift taxes paid on the gift property.
80. Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1085 at n.12 (6th Cir. 1974);
Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971). See also Citizen's
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 417 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1969); INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1015(b).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a)(1)-(2), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 106.
82. This nonallocation formula is criticized in Warren, The Income Tax
Effects of Partially Donative Transfers, 110 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 712, 714-15
(1971).
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a)(1)-(2).
84. Id.
85. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2), T.D. 6501, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 271.
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even though the donee agrees to pay them,86 the donor presumably will be deemed to have retained an income interest
within the meaning of § 2036(a) if the gift taxes are not paid
prior to his death.8 7 Consequently a portion of the donated
property will be included in the decedent-donor's gross estate. 8s However, the Code provides some relief since it allows a
credit against the federal estate tax for gift taxes paid on a
gift subsequently included in the donor's gross estate. 89
Moreover, if the donee assumes payment of the gift taxes and
pays them before the donor's death, no estate tax consequences should arise under § 2036(a) by reason of the donee's
assumption, since the donor's income interest terminates
when his legal obligation for gift taxes ceases.
When the donee has assumed an encumbrance, determination of primary liability for the indebtedness appears to be
decisive in determining whether the donor has retained an
income interest in the donated property. In Hays' Estate the
court found that upon the transfer the trust became primarily liable for the debt and, since the donor did not receive a
pecuniary benefit from repayment of the debt, it concluded
that the donor did not retain an income interest in the property.9 0
The Code provides that gifts made within three years of
the donor's death are rebuttably presumed to have been
made in contemplation of death and are included in the
donor's gross estate unless a showing is made that the gift in
fact was not made in contemplation of death.9 1 Presumably,
transfers of property within three years of death charac86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2502(d).
87. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 9-55 n.95 (1974).
88. The gross estate perhaps would include the amount of trust corpus
needed to produce the income necessary to discharge the donor's gift tax
liability. Kopp, Gifts Subject to Donee Payment of Tax: Timing, Risks, and
Computations, N.Y.U. 27TH INST. ON FED. TAXATION 375, 393-94 (1969).

89. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2012(a). Furthermore, Treas. Reg. §
20.2012-1(a) (1958), allows this credit even though the gift tax is paid after the
donor's death. Also, a credit is allowed even though the gift tax was paid by
the donee. Rev. Rul. 363, 1974-2 CUM. BULL. 290.
90. See text at notes 33-34 for a discussion of the decision.
.91. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. Furthermore, no gift is treated as
having been made in contemplation of death when the donor dies more than
three years after the date of the gift. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-(1)(d) (1958). Also,
these provisions apply to all gifts and not merely to donations of encumbered
property or net gifts.

1976]

COMMENTS

797

terized as part sales and part gifts are includable in the
donor's gross estate only to the extent of the gift portion of
the transfer, which is the excess of the fair market value of
the property over the encumbrance assumed. 92 Furthermore,
credit is allowed against the federal estate tax for gift taxes
paid on gifts included in the donor's gross estate by reason of
their being made in contemplation of death. 93
Mark A. Fullmer
92. See Treas. Reg. §:20.2043-1(a) (1958).
93. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2012. When under applicable state law gifts
are subsequently included in the donor's gross estate as gifts made in contemplation of death and the gift taxes previously paid on the gifts are considered as an advance payment of the state inheritance tax, the Service takes
the position that such prepayment of state gift taxes constitutes an asset
inuring to the benefit'of the donor's estate, the value of which is includable
in his gross estate under § 2033. Rev. Rul. 63, 1975-1 CUM. BULL. 294. Presumably, the Louisiana credit against the inheritance tax for gift taxes paid
on gifts subsequently determined to be gifts' in contemplation of death constitutes such an advance payment and falls within the scope of this recent
Revenue Ruling. See LA. R.S. 47: 1211, 2406 (1950).

